Maya v. Centex Corp. by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
11-22-2011
Maya v. Centex Corp.
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Maya v. Centex Corp." (2011). Publications. Paper 475.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/475
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963354
Maya v Centex Corp. (9th Cir, Sept. 21, 
2011, 2011 US App Lexis 19344 
Plaintiff Homeowners bought homes in new developments and alleged that defendant national residential 
developers (and their parent companies and mortgage companies) “financed at least 65% of the mortgages 
on homes in their communities” and that much of that financing was extended to “unqualified” buyers, who 
could not afford the loans and were at high risk of default. Plaintiffs claimed that (1) defendants created a 
“buying frenzy,” which increased the initial sale price of their homes (overpayment claim), and (2) had 
they known that defendants had misrepresented the future stability of the neighborhood and their intent to 
sell only to persons who would stay and grow in their homes, plaintiffs would not have bought their homes 
(rescission claim). Further, once “unqualified” buyers had defaulted and lenders had foreclosed on their 
homes, plaintiffs suffered a reduction in the economic value of their homes (“above and beyond those 
losses caused by general economic conditions”) (decreased value claim) and also suffered a decreased 
desirability of the neighborhood (desirability claims) caused by “abandoned houses, multiple families 
living in one home, transient neighborhoods, and even increased crime.” The district court dismissed all 
plaintiffs’ claims; the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
Constitutional standing under Fed R Civ P 12(b)(6) requires a plaintiff to show 
(1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
All parties conceded that item (3) was satisfied for all claims. As to the overpayment and rescission claims, 
the district court erred in finding that a future recovery in the housing market would have negated 
plaintiffs’ injuries, because plaintiffs alleged that they already had paid more than their homes were worth 
and even with an enhanced economy, they would have made better returns on the sale of their homes had 
the value not been inflated at initial sale. As alleged, defendants created an inflated housing bubble, 
particularly since they had financed most of the homes in the newly developed communities. 
In contrast, the decreased value and desirability claims were not sufficiently pleaded. Case law established 
that “a present decrease in the economic value of one’s home is a cognizable and concrete injury-in-fact.” 
The district court erred in imposing a requirement that plaintiffs must have sought to sell or state an 
intention to shortly sell their homes to establish an injury in fact. Nevertheless, plaintiffs did not establish a 
viable causal link between defendants’ actions and their claimed damages. Plaintiffs did not show how 
defendants’ actions “necessarily” led to multiple foreclosures and decreased home values and 
neighborhood desirability. But plaintiffs should have been given leave to amend, as they argued, to have 
experts establish that economic home values were depressed and neighborhood desirability decreased by 
defendants’ actions as distinguished from the impact of the general economic downturn. The case was 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
The Editor’s Take: The ostensible narrowness of the holding in this case stands in stark contrast to the very broad language included 
in much of the opinion. 
On the one hand, the court announced that it was deciding only that the plaintiffs’ complaint should survive a motion to dismiss based 
on a constitutional lack of standing under Fed R Civ P 12(b)(1). This was in contrast to three other such cases (brought in California, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina) in which dismissal was based on the more common ground of failure to state a claim under Fed R 
Civ P 12(b)(6). (All of these decisions are cited in the court’s published opinion.)  
On the other hand, the arguments for dismissal were the same in all of the cases—that the plaintiffs’ claims of injury were too 
conjectural and that the causal links between defendants’ acts and those injuries were too tenuous—and, in being rejected here, 
triggered strong language by the Ninth Circuit, language that may easily be quoted against the defendants in other contexts over and 
above the narrow Article III standing issue: 
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“Under these circumstances, plaintiffs can plausibly claim that the “artificial demand” 
created by defendants’ marketing and financing practices had an identifiable effect on the 
price they paid for their homes.... 
“There is a direct causal link between defendants’ allegedly faulty disclosure and 
plaintiffs’ injuries.... In sum we hold that plaintiffs have established both injury and 
causation sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss their claims that (1) they paid more 
for their homes than they were worth, and (2) they would not have purchased their homes 
had defendants fully disclosed their practices.... 
“Both reduction in value to one’s property (even if one has not attempted to sell the 
property) and decreased quality of life are concrete injuries.” 
Those statements may well be taken by district court judges in future matters as broad enough to support survival of complaints under 
Rule 12(b)(6) as well as under Rule 12(b)(1).  
This opinion could act as a warning shot across the bow for many major players in the real estate industry. The plaintiffs should not 
have too much trouble corroborating their factual allegations or obtaining expert testimony to endorse their theories. If they can get the 
matter to a sympathetic jury, who knows what could happen? —Roger Bernhardt 
 
